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Yes… But, also no… But, yes! But… Yeah, no.

Posted by Joshua Pulsifer (He/him) on

In Althusser’s piece “From Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)” the 20th century French philosopher expands on the work of Gramsci and other Marxist thinkers in synthesizing a genesis of ideology. Before defining ideology as a “’representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (1284) Althusser first maps the ways in which it is codified and reproduced in society. He categorizes the State as functioning through Repressive State Apparatuses (constituting the Classical Marxist interpretation of the State i.e. “bodies of armed men”) and Ideological State Apparatuses, respectively. Althusser, primarily with concerned with how ISAs operate and sustain the hegemonic power of the ruling class, goes into great detail defining different ISAs as well as giving examples in how Educational and Religious ISAs operate to provide populations “with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfill in class society: the role of the exploited” (1296). After outlining that Ideological State Apparatuses have “been installed in the dominant position in mature capitalist social formations” (1295) and thereby making the argument that ideology is the state’s dominant tool of oppression, he makes even bolder claims on what exactly ideology even is. Chiefly, his claim that “ideology has no history” (1298) positions ideology as something that does not merely arise out of a certain historical moment but is woven into the fabric of social life itself. He illustrates this point by driving home that ideology is something that we don’t consciously adopt or have but rather is deeply ingrained in us through socialization “ideology is itself forced to recognize that every ‘subject’ endowed with a ‘consciousness’…must ‘act according to his ideas’” (1303). 

There is something deeply moving about this language, particularly when Althusser notes that, “the writing I am currently executing and the reading you are currently performing are also in this respect rituals of ideological recognition, including the ‘obviousness’ with which the ‘truth’ or ‘error’ of my reflections may impose itself on you” (1305). The reader, especially those who may think of themselves as having shed their “false consciousness” is made immediately aware that ideology is something all people are subject to; something you cannot think yourself out of. From pre-conception, we “are always ‘abstract[ed]’” (1307)  through the process of ideology. 

As Althusser “wishes to defend formally speaking adopts the terms of The German Ideology” (1299) I wish to defend Althusser’s ideas as well. However, with that said, I also can’t help but feel as if Althusser is sort of missing the point of ideology. His comparison to Freud’s “eternal” and ahistorical unconsciousness, while beautiful, feels lame when applied to ideology, if it is at all useful to the ends in which, as a Marxist, he probably believes it can be. Such terms erase the myriad ways in which ideology is completely arbitrary, absurd, deconstructed, and put back together all the time. In the way Althusser seems to be presenting it, ideology seems to be functioning uniformly without the contradictions it inherently encompasses on such a large scale, but this is a fundamental aspect of understanding how people engage with it, and how societies are built are and of it. Through a lens of multiplicity, we observe the devout Christian who is also a fervent, communist labor activist, right-wing nationalist queer movements, pro-gun pacifists, and so on. 

Furthermore, how does this uniformity of ideology conform to different regions of the world? Even with my rudimentary understanding of Sinological studies, I find no lack of problems when trying to ascribe Western notions of ideology to the ways society forms and functions in China, for example. If there is a “fundamental structure of ideology” which reduces it “to ideas endowed by definition” (1307), an ideology “eternal” (1308), it seems to be one so subject to disruption, inconsistency, and dissolution as to not have much of a consequence on society at all. In a way, such a view is almost more reminiscent of the German Idealists that Marx disagrees with than with Marx himself. I do believe Althusser is working hard to make us aware that our material conditions are nevertheless dripping in the fabric of this process, and I accept that. I just question the weight of its practicality. 

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A Look On How The National Consciousness Is A Form of Double-Conscious

Posted by Jonathan Toro on

Can one look at what Frantz Fanon calls “national consciousness” — a collective social consciousness that identifies with a national identity, often swayed by rules written by figureheads — which for Fanon are the colonialist — to mend the divisions within — what W.E.B Du Bois calls “double-consciousness” — bisected by ingrained ideologies (both state & civil or as Louis Althusser calls respectively repressive state apparatus & ideological state apparatus) to lead towards self-healing, propagating national healing, and opening “up the struggle of freedom?”

How one thinks, acts, and lives are determined by ideologies implemented by those with authorial power, those figureheads; national consciousness constitutes these same compounds of ideologies to exist. For Althusser, our national consciousness comprises two ideological apparatuses, the repressive state apparatus & ideological state apparatus. And it’s here that consciousness and the self are demarcated — although not initially, for as Gabor Mate theorizes in his book, “When The Body Says No,” one’s two-ness is genetic, starting before one is born and with one’s parents. The RSA is a system employed by the ruling class “in order to achieve their tasks” (Norton, 1366) through violence and repression by utilizing institutions, such as courts, police, armed forces, and more, to conduct their biding; their biding to keep status quo, to keep their ideologies in place. The RSA is an apparatus that uses fear to keep citizens in line, and in the Marxian sense, as objects to be used and re-used for “their tasks.” The ISA is a civil system that uses soft power. This non-violent approach utilizes education, media, churches, sports clubs, and even family to conceal and mask the ruling class’s ideology behind the “liberating qualities” of education, media, etc., so that the hidden agendas of the ruling class are inconspicuous.

Between state and civil ideologies, between fear of violence and the sublimity of soft power, where does a person stand? When always in a battle of two-ness between ideologies, how can a person know oneself honestly, understand one’s world, and feel whole enough to heal oneself and assist in healing the nation? And most importantly, how can one know their thoughts are their thoughts, not those foisted by the figureheads, the ruling class?

One way many people deal with these questions is quite Saussurian; they tend to compare themselves to others to ensure they follow society’s unspoken rules and comment no embarrassing faux pas. However, this only causes resentment for the other, anger, stress, and bemusement within, and most detrimental, indolence and insouciance for anything concerning life.

Another way people may deal with these questions is to look at history. Indeed world history is essential, but here, one’s personal and cultural history gives one more understanding of self and society and can help elevate culture outside the ideologies of the ruling classes. Fanon, in his book, “Black Skin, White Masks,” does just this, and what he discovers is that his heritage is rich in culture: “The white man was wrong. I was not primitive, not even a half man; I belonged to a race that had already been working with gold and silver two thousand years ago (Norton, 1354.)” But in surveying history, another problem surfaces, that of the gatekeepers, who often are the ruling class, that, on the one hand, rebuke those who venture outside of the hegemonic circumference and, on the other, hold close to the chest any ways to expand the circumference.

“I wanted to be white— that was a joke. And, when I tried, on the level of ideas and intellectual activity, to reclaim my negritude, it was snatched away from me. (Norton, 1355.)” Through his survey of history and the rebuke from the man, Fanon faces a duality, a double-consciousness, a two-ness in his search for one-ness in a society that saw him not as a person, but an object to keep the ideological tasks in motion, a cog in the industrial machine. This is the national consciousness — an identity that is separate and steeped in ideological confusion, to have no choice but to follow what lies before them — and with the RSA, fear of walking the paths less traveled (thus, missing opportunities) is predominant in the mind. People stay in place, hiding behind “the veil,” never acknowledging their two-ness, which is a gift that leads to “second sight,” and thus, may “open up the struggle of freedom?”

But how do we acknowledge and accept our double consciousness to be whole and part of society on one’s own terms? Indeed, watching others and surveying history have their benefits, but it’s through expression that one can merge the two sides within and without. In “Black Mask, White Face,” Fanon gives the example of Algeria from 1952 to 1955. Before colonialism, “the storytellers, who were before that time stereotyped and tedious to listen to, completely overturned their traditional methods of storytelling and the contents of their tales (Norton, 1363.)” Although colonialism arrested these storytellers, it’s through music, writing, dancing, singing, and any form of creation, that there’s a place to see oneself and society. This opens up oneself and society to “the struggle for freedom.” And thus, begin the healing process. The healing of the soul, body, mind, society, nation, etc. By doing this, one can alter and reshape the national consciousness to include them, their ideas, and culture, thus, expanding — no, changing — the hegemonic circumference. And maybe then, as a society, we can focus on more egalitarian approaches to unite people.

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Blog Post 4 – Gramsci

Posted by Gledis Spada (He/Him) on

In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci distinguishes between two types of intellectuals: the “organic” and the “traditional.” The traditional intellectual is someone who is trained in the humanities and social sciences and produces abstract knowledge. They are often associated with the academic establishment and are removed from the everyday struggles of working-class people. They tend to see themselves as objective observers of society, instead of as dynamic members in social and political battles. The organic intellectual, on the other hand, is someone who is rooted in the working-class community and who develops a theoretical understanding of the world through their experiences and struggles. They see themselves as dynamic members within the battle for social equity. They are often associated with social movements and popular education.

For Gramsci, the social function of the traditional intellectual is to maintain the status quo and reproduce dominant cultural and political values. The organic intellectual works on the interests of the working-class community and they develop an understanding of the struggles. An example of traditional intellectuals in our own time might include university professors who produce abstract knowledge for the sake of professional advancement. Organic intellectuals can include community organizers, educators, etc. Education and educational institutions are crucial to modern society, according to Gramsci, because they play a key role in the reproduction of cultural and political hegemony. He argues that working-class people must develop their own educational institutions and methods. Something I agree with Gramsci is when he talks about education not being just a matter of transmitting knowledge and skills, but is also a site of struggle over ideas and values.

In conclusion, Gramsci’s distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals highlights the importance of developing a critical understanding of social and political struggles and using that knowledge to mobilize and organize working-class communities. He focuses on education and institutions relating to the importance of developing alternative forms of providing knowledge.

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Description and Significance of RSAs and ISAs in Society from Althusser’s “Ideology and ISAs”

Posted by John Danyliouk on

In Althusser’s “Ideology and ISAs”, he constructs the argument surrounding the formation of how ideology is created and functions in society and how it relates to the distinction between RSAs (Repressive State Apparatuses) and ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) in the essence of how the descriptions of the two maintain power and order in society. Althusser argues in his text that the state is not a neutral institution, but rather an apparatus that maintains the dominance of the ruling class through ideology. In order to keep the institutions maintained in society would be through the purpose of RSAs and ISAs. According to Althusser, the RSAs contain the likes of the government and police force that help to perpetuate coercion into following and abiding the laws in society to individuals to recognize their ideologies in what would be constituted as right and wrong according to figures of authority and in power as well as individuals openly able to abide by the laws or not. On the other hand, ISAs contain the likes of institutions like schools, churches, media, and the family, which play a crucial role in the reproduction of the dominant ideology. The dominant ideology is the set of beliefs, values, and norms that reinforce the existing social and economic order, and it is transmitted through the ISAs from one generation to the next. ISAs are important in society ideologically because it allows for people to develop their own individual ideology through the teachings in school or at the home and how in modern society media plays a major role in political alignment for an individual according to what type of media is being consumed and how social media reflects a person’s ideology through what the individual is seeing and acting upon what is shown in it such as on YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, etc. According to Althusser, the ISAs also operate through two mechanisms: “interpellation” and “subjectification.” Interpellation is the process by which individuals are hailed or called into a particular subject position within the dominant ideology. Subjectification is the process by which individuals come to see themselves as subjects of the dominant ideology, internalizing its values and norms as their own. Thus, these two mechanisms allow for the maintaining of order through interpellation and subjectification of individuals in society because the dominant ideology influences the masses in how individuals think and act upon in society. In his text, an important piece about his argument is that he argues that ideology is not simply a set of false beliefs, but rather a necessary component of social reproduction. The dominant ideology serves to maintain the existing power relations, by creating the illusion of social harmony and concealing the contradictions and conflicts inherent in the capitalist system. In conclusion, Althusser’s argument helps to develop the description and significance of how the RSAs and ISAs shape individuals ideological demeanors and how it influences and develops society as a whole in the basis of his argument throughout the text.

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