Yes… But, also no… But, yes! But… Yeah, no.
In Althusser’s piece “From Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)” the 20th century French philosopher expands on the work of Gramsci and other Marxist thinkers in synthesizing a genesis of ideology. Before defining ideology as a “’representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (1284) Althusser first maps the ways in which it is codified and reproduced in society. He categorizes the State as functioning through Repressive State Apparatuses (constituting the Classical Marxist interpretation of the State i.e. “bodies of armed men”) and Ideological State Apparatuses, respectively. Althusser, primarily with concerned with how ISAs operate and sustain the hegemonic power of the ruling class, goes into great detail defining different ISAs as well as giving examples in how Educational and Religious ISAs operate to provide populations “with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfill in class society: the role of the exploited” (1296). After outlining that Ideological State Apparatuses have “been installed in the dominant position in mature capitalist social formations” (1295) and thereby making the argument that ideology is the state’s dominant tool of oppression, he makes even bolder claims on what exactly ideology even is. Chiefly, his claim that “ideology has no history” (1298) positions ideology as something that does not merely arise out of a certain historical moment but is woven into the fabric of social life itself. He illustrates this point by driving home that ideology is something that we don’t consciously adopt or have but rather is deeply ingrained in us through socialization “ideology is itself forced to recognize that every ‘subject’ endowed with a ‘consciousness’…must ‘act according to his ideas’” (1303).
There is something deeply moving about this language, particularly when Althusser notes that, “the writing I am currently executing and the reading you are currently performing are also in this respect rituals of ideological recognition, including the ‘obviousness’ with which the ‘truth’ or ‘error’ of my reflections may impose itself on you” (1305). The reader, especially those who may think of themselves as having shed their “false consciousness” is made immediately aware that ideology is something all people are subject to; something you cannot think yourself out of. From pre-conception, we “are always ‘abstract[ed]’” (1307) through the process of ideology.
As Althusser “wishes to defend formally speaking adopts the terms of The German Ideology” (1299) I wish to defend Althusser’s ideas as well. However, with that said, I also can’t help but feel as if Althusser is sort of missing the point of ideology. His comparison to Freud’s “eternal” and ahistorical unconsciousness, while beautiful, feels lame when applied to ideology, if it is at all useful to the ends in which, as a Marxist, he probably believes it can be. Such terms erase the myriad ways in which ideology is completely arbitrary, absurd, deconstructed, and put back together all the time. In the way Althusser seems to be presenting it, ideology seems to be functioning uniformly without the contradictions it inherently encompasses on such a large scale, but this is a fundamental aspect of understanding how people engage with it, and how societies are built are and of it. Through a lens of multiplicity, we observe the devout Christian who is also a fervent, communist labor activist, right-wing nationalist queer movements, pro-gun pacifists, and so on.
Furthermore, how does this uniformity of ideology conform to different regions of the world? Even with my rudimentary understanding of Sinological studies, I find no lack of problems when trying to ascribe Western notions of ideology to the ways society forms and functions in China, for example. If there is a “fundamental structure of ideology” which reduces it “to ideas endowed by definition” (1307), an ideology “eternal” (1308), it seems to be one so subject to disruption, inconsistency, and dissolution as to not have much of a consequence on society at all. In a way, such a view is almost more reminiscent of the German Idealists that Marx disagrees with than with Marx himself. I do believe Althusser is working hard to make us aware that our material conditions are nevertheless dripping in the fabric of this process, and I accept that. I just question the weight of its practicality.


