Gramsci begins his essay The Formation of the Intellectuals with the question, “Are Intellectuals an autonomous and independent social group, or does every social group have its own particular specialized category of intellectuals?” (929), a problem that he goes on to say is complex for the reason that there are a variety of different kinds of intellectuals due to the many different processes of formation. He calls these different processes “forms”, that were enabled by the historical processes of formation, and claims that there are two most important forms that we should focus on.

The first important form of the development of intellectuals is the idea that every social group will naturally create their own category of intellectuals who pay homage with their participation in said social group. An example that Gramsci provides is one of intellectuals under the capitalism; he says “The capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organizers of a new culture… It should be noted that the entrepreneur himself represents a higher level of social elaboration, already characterized by a certain directive and technical capacity.” (930). It can be thought of as an pyramid, where those highest up on the pyramid are experts in a field, breeding “intellectuals”, all those underneath them, and sharing their knowledge. Each level on the pyramid passes on their knowledge to the level below them, and it continues on as it has been historically.

The second important form is the idea that every existing social structure represents a historical continuity of intellectuals, as these social structures have been developed to do such. He says, “The most typical of these categories of intellectuals is that the ecclesiastics, who for a long time (for a whole phase of history, which partly characterized this very monopoly) held a monopoly of a number of important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy of science of the age, together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works, etc.” (931). These social structures have been built and operate on a system that encourages those within them to develop and carry on with intellectual activities. With this said, Gramsci made an important note that all men participate in intellectual activities within these social structures, whether it be voluntary or involuntary, but this participation does not mean that all men possess a societal function as an intellectual. Gramsci says that social structures like this attempt to deepen and broaden the “intellectuality” of individuals, school being the structure that does this the most.

He calls intellectuals “functionaries” (934) in the fabric of society and its superstructures, a phrase that emphasizes the idea that we operate within these structures. But I partly disagree because without intellectual participants to uphold this structure, they would collapse, as this participation is what has continued these social groups historically. I believe that functionary is not the word to describe intellectuals, because while we all are “functionaries” in Gramsci’s terms, we do a lot more than just operate within these systems; we promote them and voluntarily participate, which is what allows them to keep existing.

Marx starts the fourth section of Capital’s first chapter by speaking about the fetishism of commodities, and how the “metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (667) surrounding commodities make them “queer”. The metaphysical and theological niceties that he speaks of are the abstract concepts that we attach to the commodities we produce and consume, as well as the practices and experiences that give them so much value in our minds. The value that we attach to commodities has nothing to do with what they are, but what they have been transformed into by way of manual labor, which Marx believes to be unusual because of the “fetishism” that it’s rooted in, an idea that he presents early on in his essay.

Commodities have an undeniable value in their usage, whether their purpose is to please humans or serve a different purpose, but the price value of a commodity is determined by the production that the item underwent, as manual labor makes commodities more “valuable”. To give a better understanding of how manual labor changes the psychological value of an object, Marx provides the example of table, which is a common item, wood, in a different form. The fact that wood is now useful to humans in the form of a table changes it to something “transcendent” (668) and evolved into something with more value once presented as a commodity. But the value of the commodity is not what makes it “queer”, it is the idea that they are products of men’s labor, which gets “fetishized” and used to set the price value of an item.

Men’s relation to the commodities they produce is what makes them profitable, an idea that Marx calls the fetishism of commodities. He says that “the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor” (668). This fetishism “attaches” itself to the products of men’s labor as soon as they are presented as commodities and makes the idea that a man created them inseparable from the item itself.”

This ideology immediately makes me think of the climate crisis that we are currently experiencing, as well as the methods that people are using to try and prevent the crisis from worsening. In the fashion industry, as well as others, brands that are more sustainable have the highest “value” in today’s crisis, though they are not as affordable. The most sustainably made items are those that are handmade, as these create the least waste and consume the least energy. Handmade items have the highest costs, as they have been carefully crafted by a human rather than in a factory; the fact that the commodity is handmade is a fact that attaches itself, as the item is marketed and priced as such. Manmade items and the “fetishism” of commodities always coincide, but it may be beneficial in the prevention of a worse climate condition.

At long last, here is the final:

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Good luck! Due Tuesday at midnight.

Rob Nixon states slow violence occurs gradually and is not necessarily readily identifiable. Slow violence often develops over long periods and disproportionately affects marginalized communities. Because slow violence usually occurs slowly, policymakers may struggle to identify and fix the issue. Sometimes, politicians may be aware of the problem and choose to avoid passing legislature to deal with the case because it immediately affects low-income individuals and often people of color with little access to political power and whose well-being is not prioritized by the leaders and decision-makers of society. An incredible example of environmental injustice is the Flint water crisis in Flint, Michigan, between 2014 and 2019.

In 2014, the Michigan council switched its drinking water supply from the Flint River to the Detroit River. The city appointed an emergency manager to cut city costs which conveniently affected the Flint, Michigan residents, predominately African American, of whom 45% fall below the poverty line. The city was pumping and not treating lead-contaminated water into over 100,000 people’s homes for over a year; the contaminated water was a product of urban and agricultural runoff, untreated refuse from meatpacking, lumbar, and paper mills, as well as raw sewage from the cities waste treatment. Flint residents consistently complained about foul-smelling and tasting water and skin rashes after showering. The response from the city was dismissive as officials constantly reassured that everything was fine and the water was safe for consumption eventhough it was never tested nor treated. The Flint Water crisis epitomizes the environmentalism of people experiencing poverty. Ultimately, the actions and lack thereof are deeply rooted in systemic racism and failure to tend to the needs of marginalized groups, particularly people of color.

In contrast to The Flint Water Crisis, the response to The World Trade Center bombing was more readily apparent because of this event’s immediate impact on individuals. Additionally, an event such as a terrorist attack has a clear target with a primary source for retribution. After the bombing of the World Trade Center, the United States quickly figured out that al-Qaeda was responsible and could take immediate action with a focused target and response mechanism. On the contrary, slow violence affects individuals over long periods and therefore requires planning and a political will to deal with systemic injustice. Often if a city has politicians with conservative and often racist views, slow violence will not be dealt with and only be addressed when the population takes action to make their voices heard by protesting and demanding change.

Donna Haraway’s work “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin” is a short yet extremely interesting perspective on the relations between humankind and nature. She first talks about the untenableness of the current Anthropocene, of humankind’s total domination of nature where their activities reflect an attitude toward the earth which is one of perceiving it as something to be exploited. Humankind has thus far, and especially with the dawn of Capitalism, only extracted resources from the earth and in doing so has caused irreversible changes to the global ecosystem such that the current way of life that such past and present ecological destruction props up is going to become impossible.

With the Anthropocene inevitably coming to an end, so too will the hegemony of humankind over the earth. Haraway argues that the Chtulucene will necessitate not the desperate reproduction of the human race to maintain their domination, but the production of cooperative and self-sustaining systems between humans and other beings that live on planet earth. We need to move past looking upon the earth as an infinite well of resources that we can just continuously take from, and start looking upon the earth including all of its ecosystems and biodiversity as something to lodge ourselves into and become an integral part of a larger ecosystem.

When Haraway speaks of not being a posthumanist but rather a compostist, I believe she’s further deconstructing the ideas underlying the ideology of the Anthropocene. The idea of a post-human, something that will come after humankind and perhaps replace it, some kind of ubermensch or other type of subject, all of these ideas still maintain the fundamental relation between humanity or whatever post-humanity that exists and all the other beings that exist within nature: unsustainable and self-defeating exploitation and domination. Rather, what the idea of composting does is bring the human down to the level of the rest of nature from their false and self-endowed position of superiority. The very idea behind compost is the repurposing of waste into a means of producing new life and new beings that are useful for us. To reorient the way we think of ourselves toward being compost rather than as preliminaries for a higher being (which still is fundamentally human in its relation to the earth) is to treat ourselves and our activities as a part of a broader self-regulating ecosystem that is the earth, the Chtulucene, where we encompass a definite place and provide a definite function for other beings as they do for us. It’s not a relation of domination and exploitation, but a relation of cooperation—and as Hawaray puts it: kinship.

To consider objects or “things” as autonomous and possessing individuality outside humanity ( a “thing-power,” a “strange ability” of ordinary objects to have vitality, to have life, and energy) seems a demented, drug-induced idea. How can a rock have feelings? A personality? Is a rock a man or female? Does it matter? Does a rock have a life, like with a mama rock and baby rocks? Energy or a spirit? Aren’t these notions human concepts, and some farfetched when placed on a rock? For Jane Bennett, in Vibrant Matter, the human element starts the problem: thinking of objects in terms of the human gaze. We live in a human-centered world; everything directly connects to our humanness. Or else, to the storm drain! 

Jane Bennet begins to solve the material-based problem of the subject (human) and object (thing) dilemma facing things, to divert the human gaze from ego to universal, thus reshaping how humans interact and perceive the purpose, function, and life of an object. Bennett and other “cultural theorists and philosophers” believed in an “object-oriented ontology,” aiming towards a “flat ontology,” what they call “new materialism.” The ideas concerning all these nonce words are similar: one, to untether objects from human practices or discourse, and two, to view objects against no structural or hierarchal judgments. In considering objects under new materialism, the object seems to have a new life and vitality. In a Saussurean sense, the objects are no longer tied to signs and signifiers enfolded within an unspoken “social contract.” 

However, Nietzsche can help us understand new materialism better. Like Saussurean, he writes about a “social contract,” a “peace treaty,” an unspoken contract amongst people that systemizes and categorizes social communication and measures one’s intelligence and sociability. It is this implicit contract that gives arbitrary meanings to things. In Friedrich Nietzsche’s essay, On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense, Nietzsche emphasizes the weight of words; they are not what they seem to mean at first sight and should not be superficial. Nietzsche uses the example of a stone and how it’s customary to say, “A stone is hard,” worthless, and with no purpose. It’s just there. It’s a rock, not a Benz. It’s a rock, not a Gibson guitar. However, Nietzsche questions how one can know the nature of hard “as if “hard” were something familiar to us (754.).” 

In other words, who or what deems that hard and worthless are what stones are? Who or what deems a stone is what one thinks of as gray, solid, and immovable? Now, Nietzsche’s not saying that a stone is a sponge is a can of soda. No, like Bennette, Nietzsche wants the reader to consider the truth of who they are and their communication. They want people to stop hiding behind the “peace treaty” and to be like a Buddhist, see that the stone is the caterpillar that climbs it and is the air that blows upon them. Nietzsche and Bennette want the reader to think “beyond the bounds of human existence (752.).” They want sedition against the “peace treaty.” 

Yes, screw the peace treaty! That rock (stone) ain’t worthless! It has thing-power! The big old rock in the middle of the forest has a history: it’s been in the forest for five hundred years; storms and glacial melting has moved it due west. It was once the only rock, but the abrasive wind made smaller out it. It’s gray, white, and black and shimmers under the sun. From afar, it’s small; up close, it towers over a human. Indeed, it’s a rock, but it’s a chair for the writer every Saturday, a check-point for the runner every day, a reminder of Colorado for the home-sick woman, a hide-out for the kids playing tag, and a shelter for the squirrel and snake during storms. But it’s so much more: it can be a place of peace and tranquility, it can be a tool, it can be a Dada-like art piece in a gallery, its pebble-children are pendants on necklaces — this list is endless for this one rock. As all humans know, the rock speaks to other rocks in a frequency only rocks can hear. In essence, and to repeat, the rock is not worthless, and to agree with Bennett, it has a vitality (seen and unseen.)

In many ways, Bennett, Nietzsche, Saussure, and the minds behind new materialism want us to see that the worthless is full of worth, find meaning in nothing, and reshape our world by thinking and rethinking how we participate in it. But most important, at least to this writer, is that by suggesting to separate humanness from objects, these thinkers force us to think about our humanness and its ramifications, such as the case with the Anthropocene. 

Freud analyzes that Oedipus Rex is able to move audiences deeply, not for its tragic tale of a man unable to fight God’s will, but for its disturbing reflection of sexual repressions. Despite all mimicry, it is a play that no modern playwright is able to rival, for they cannot grasp — nor do they wish to grasp — the nature of such senseless taboos. Freud argues that King Oedipus’ fate of slaying his father Lai’us and marrying his mother Jocasta — all while unaware of their identities, is an oracle that we have all desired(…) but fortunately never fulfilled; an unconscious wish to (…)love thy mother in envy of the father who rightfully holds the right. Unlike King Oedipus, Hamlet also held the same fortune as us, whereas Freud forces an unseemly connection with the thoughtful mention that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet immediately after his father’s death; faced with the ghost of his father who seeks vengeance, Hamlet hesitates as he sees his own reflection in the man who successfully stole away his mother — although sexual desires had remain repressed until the end, Hamlet’s self-reproach proved Freud’s analysis true — they were all sinners. With this conclusion that shared no imaginable connection to the play’s plot but was nevertheless true within its own complexity, Freud had displayed the strange multiplicity(overdetermination) of dream interpretation as he translated the unconscious into the conscious. 

While others analyze dreams as pictorial compositions through their manifest content, Freud sees an alternative as he creates a new task. He considers latent content as the key to dream interpretation, hence he must seek the connection between the manifest content displayed within dreams and the latent dream-thoughts that influence the essence of those dreams. Freud compares dream content to a rebus puzzle — it is the transcript of coherent dream-thoughts into pictographic script filled with absurd senselessness; when faced with such distortions dreams must be read through their symbolic relations rather than their pictorial values. However, transcribing dream-thoughts into dream content is a process of condensation where unconscious thoughts that have been plaguing the mind from a range of days to years are compressed into a brief dyslexic dream that may not even last eight hours. Therefore, overdetermination is never truly “over-” no matter how complete or logical the proposed material is because one cannot determine the degree of condensation and neither can they truly ever finish translating a dream. With this in mind, forced and far-fetched connections that bear no visible relation to the dream’s content like Freud’s idea of sexual repression within Hamlet — which neither I nor the audience ever thought of — are necessary to break away from what Freud calls the censorship of endopsychic defense — the displacement that turns dreams into code.

Laura Mulvey, a British feminist film theorist , brings to us the essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” to express her views on the Hollywood cinema. This essay brings light to the representation of genders in cinemas and the effect of the “male gaze”. Mulvey’s argument is about the way that women were viewed in the film industry and how this was the cause of the cinema being controlled by male screenwriters. She goes on about how these films shined light to the power structure and dynamics by presenting women as objects and how their sole purpose for being there, is for the male desire and pleasure.

This is why she brings up the concept of scopophilia. This is the term which is used to refer to the male pleasure of looking at women as objects. She writes how this division of gender in films created a power dynamic in which men are active and women are passive. Going forward she mentions how this power dynamic is reinforced by the narrative structure of classical Hollywood cinema. She suggests that the narrative is structured around the desires of the male protagonist, while the female characters are typically presented as passive objects of desire. Supporting the idea that women exist primarily for male pleasure.

Mulvey also argues of the different perspectives in the film industry, the camera, the characters and the audience. I think it’s important to see that whichever perspective you are in, it will always be something that is of pleasure to the male gaze. If we are talking about the characters perspective , the women is always just by the side of the male protagonist, just to appeal to his eyes. The visuals and the character of the female gender are solely the view and the reality desires of the male gaze outside the screen. If you were to change the perspective to the camera or the audience , you would see that it is to ,once again, appeal to the male’s eyes. We saw a great example of this on the short clip we saw in class. The short clip consisted of a man who is sat on a couch and a women dressed in clothes that would appeal to his eyes. We see how the making of the movie was made for the male gaze as we are put in the character’s perspective. We get the shot of them together, which later when the camera shifts, we get the view that the male protagonist had of the women, making us now be part of the male gaze.

The world that we reside in is in danger of irreversible damage due to human operations. The rate at which the environment is adapting calls for hasty decisions that will alter the results of human consumption and disposal. Donna Haraway’s article, “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin”, addresses not climate change itself but the severity of its development in the recent epoch. The author expresses the continuous burden of attempting to undo major systematic failures. The preservation of natural resources is an arduous task as the supply is constantly in demand. Humans have stripped away these raw materials from the planet for consumption.

Haraway’s use of the term “Anthropocene” primarily describes an allocution that questions the quality of natural resources in an attempt to restore them. The strain of refugees of diverse populations and the lack of quantity of endangered supplies will not be fully rehabilitated. However, the refugees mentioned do not concern humans but other species that are residents of nature. Though the population won’t fully recover, the length of the Anthropocene stage must remain as short as possible to minimize its effects of it on society. In relation to civilization, Capitalocene is the involvement of the economic system in conjunction with nature. It is the structure in which human beings must organize their relations with nature. The heightened population of humans do not allow the destruction to be undone due to the everlasting demand for natural resources. Plantationocene is not deeply confronted in this article but it links racial identities and how their labor had impacted the industry of distributed goods. The large scale production of agricultural resources in the past and present have encouraged the thrive of modern economies and social relations through commerce. The exploitation of this labor directly affects both lower-classed workers and the adjoining environment as well. Lastly, the Chthulucene encourages the mourning of the unrepairable losses that are influencing the decline of a healthy habitat. Understanding that humans are not immune to extinction or failure is necessary to make perceptible and efficacious changes for the future. Haraway links this concept to the “The Dithering” that labels this era as the “state of indecisive agitation”. The lack of urgency towards preserving what is left will only create more adversities later in our lifetimes and the future generations. The past generations of kin have affected us despite being our strangers and we have that same capabilities. However as time passes, we experience more deprivation as a society with the birth of each generation.