Detours and More
According to Freud, in order for us to enjoy love, there need to be obstacles to attaining our objects of desire, and if there is a lack, we, ourselves, create such obstacles in order to obtain any deep psychical and physical pleasure from engaging in the act of love. Lacan improves upon this theory, as Zizek! notes, stating that the obstacles we create are there to conceal the impossibility of attaining our object of desire. The object of desire or the Lady in “courtly love” is, in fact, not an object at all, but a void upon which we project our desires and, thereby, which we transform from void into object through the expectations that this void-made-object could fulfill our desires if snared. We entirely forget, though, that it is we who have created the object which embodies the fulfillment of these desires and the obstacles to it, and arguably, that we have created the desires as well. Lacan argues that, without these self-constructed obstacles, one would be able to see the Lady for what she is, a “black hole.” However, our own hindrances, or, detours, supplant the void and both actualize and perpetuate the mirage that is the object of desire. In addition to creating the object, the detours then lead us to the elevation of the object into the das ding, the unattainable Real, which, in turn, actualizes desire. The fulfillment of desire is, after all, the end of desire. Thus, the Lady begins as an ‘unserviceable’ void, upon which we create an object, whose unattainability transforms the unserviceable void into a serviceable one. The void starts out as the source of nothing and becomes the source of desire. (is that it?) Zizek! makes the point that it is the end of this desire, which terrifies the lover deeply. Arguably, the knight fears the end of desire for the Lady because it means the end of his quest and his suffering, which dictates the nobility upon which his very identity relies. An immensely different kind of suffering, one of dying without death, would ensue, were the quest to end.
Moreover, can one still say that the Lady is a creature with whom one is unable to empathize as she is elevated into the realm of Lacanian’s Real and say that the Lady is not a spiritualization. In my opinion, one need not to empathize with one’s spiritual guide in order for the guide to properly carry out his or, in this case, her, or perhaps even more accurately, its role. A saint, one with superior spiritual knowledge or experience, is necessarily inhuman and distanced. The argument Zizek! provides to counter the Lady’s spiritualization is the “unspiritual” nature of the Lady’s demands such as licking her ‘arse’. “The Lady is thus as far as possible from any kind of purified spirituality” (2408). Even if this example does not reflect a purified spirituality on the part of the Lady, can one argue that she is an “automaton” as Zizek! does through this example. I would argue no because the knight’s fear is fecal odor and the possible urination upon his head from the Lady. The fact that the Lady can defecate places her in the realm of human and animal not somewhere beyond. These necessities do not identify the Lady as radically other, while they may eliminate a sense of her spiritual purification, but they are the foundation of an innate comradeship.


